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LA WFUL CYBER DECOY POLICY 
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Abstract: Cyber decoys provide a means for automating, to a degree, counterintelligence 
activities and responses to cyber attacks. Like other security mechanisms for 
protecting information systems, it is likely that cyber decoys will in some in-
stances be misused. In the United States, criminal law provides us with analo-
gies for preventing or punishing improper state use of deception, and criminal 
and civil law give us a range of tools to use against private actors. However, 
in addition to states, nongovernmental entities and individuals can employ cy-
bel' decoys. In this paper we present a principled analysis of the use of cyber 
decoys. We explore the absolute minima in terms of customary principles for 
what might be considered to be acceptable use of deception. 
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1. DECEPTION IN CYBERSPACE 
In [1], Michael et al. propose to use software-based deception as a means 
for hardening operational systems against attack. Critical units of software 
are wrapped with "decoying" rules, which are the cyber embodiment of both 
the policy (including doctrine) of an organization or individual for conduct-
ing counterintelligence and applying countermeasures against attackers. The 
wrappers are placed around critical units of software (e.g., a component or 
method) to be protected. By critical, we mean units of software that are in-
tegral to the continued survivability of an information system and the correct 
enforcement of the policy embedded in the system. 
When a wrapper detects a suspicious pattern of system calls by one or 
more computer processes, it begins to conduct counterintelligence tasks and 
initiates countermeasures; pattern recognition is performed at runtime. The 
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wrappers, referred to as "decoys," conduct counterintelligence by allowing 
the interaction with suspicious processes to continue, collecting information 
about the nature of the processes' behavior. The wrappers respond to re-
quests for service from the processes by applying countermeasures, with co-
ordination of their responses provided by "decoy supervisors." The coun-
termeasures include actions taken to shield the wrapped software from any 
ill effects of the interaction, and the responses to the processes that are 
needed to deceive the attacker into concluding that his or her computer proc-
esses are successfully carrying out their mission. As new patterns of suspi-
cious behavior are discovered, the database of rules for counterintelligence 
and countermeasure actions is updated. 
1.1 A potential "homeland security" application 
Homeland security within the United States encompasses, among other 
things, the protection of public and private cybernetic property against es-
pionage and sabotage, especially if such a compromise would have a signifi-
cant adverse effect on the national security of the United States. I 
Let's make the discussion of software decoys more concrete by consid-
ering how they can be used to protect a particular type of cybernetic prop-
erty-a public-switched telephone network (PSTN). Within a PSTN, soft-
ware units that authenticate subscribers to the network are necessary for en-
forcing policy against unauthorized eavesdropping on conversations. In ad-
dition, the survivability of a PSTN is contingent on the continued correct 
functioning of the software that implements the Signaling System 7 (SS7) 
protocol. Thus, by our definition, these software units are system-critical. 
Software decoys can be created for both the subscriber-authentication 
and SS7 software units. For instance, these software units can be wrapped 
so that they discover patterns of system-level events that are indicative of 
attempts to cause exceptions to be raised in normally infrequently-called 
methods of these software units-such invocations of methods constitute a 
form of suspicious behavior. On detecting a sequence of invocations, such 
as one that would cause a buffer overflow, the decoys would begin gathering 
information about the nature of the calling processes' behavior. If a process 
continues to try to raise exceptions, the decoys could, for instance, fake er-
ror-handling messages with the aim of making it appear to the process that 
the exception was raised and not handled. The goal of the decoy at this point 
is to maintain interaction with the process, providing the decoy with the op-
portunity to gather more information about the nature of the interaction. If 
analysis of the interaction is indicative of an attack, the decoy may be able to 
discern the sources and methods of the attack, using this information to make 
decisions about whether to applying passive (i.e., strictly defensive on the 
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attacked system) or active (i.e., counterattack) countermeasures. Likewise, 
the decoys may discover the interaction is non-malicious in nature, notifying 
the owner of the process of his or her egregious use of the software units; 
this addresses, to some extent, the need to correctly handle false positives. 
1.2 Potential for misuse of decoys 
The users of software decoys need to employ counterintelligence and 
countermeasures in a judicious manner, so as to prevent their misuse. For 
instance, software decoys, like any other software, can behave in unantici-
pated ways due to the presence of unknown software defects; defects can 
cause side effects that result in the generation of inappropriate responses. 
Similarly, the decoys may be poorly designed in terms of the breadth of re-
sponses, or in terms of the fidelity with which they implement the owning 
organization's policy. Alternatively, the decoys may not have built-in con-
trols to prevent users or their decoys from inadvertently contravening an or-
ganization's policy on the use of countermeasures and counterintelligence; 
the foregoing examples exemplify the techllical misuse of decoys. 
Suppose that a public telephone company instructs the decoys used in 
conjunction with its SS7 software to provide deceptive responses, such as 
exaggerated delays, to the communication devices used by customers of 
competing telephone service providers, with the aim of providing those users 
with a degraded level of service. In the United States, injecting such delays 
is legal as there is no general duty on the part of nongovernmental entities to 
tell the truth: suboptimal performance is rarely, if ever, unlawful per se. In 
the eyes of some, the exaggerated delays represent a misuse of the technol-
ogy in that the company might gain an unfair competitive advantage. We 
call this intentiollallawful misuse of decoys. 
FUlther, suppose the federal agencies within the United States employ 
software decoys. If the National Security Agency were to use the decoys to 
collect information about attackers who turn out to be U.S. citizens, this 
would be a violation of federal law. We refer to this as an example of Ullin-
telltiollal unlal1;ful use of decoys. One means proposed in [2] for countering 
this and the other types of misuse is to make the decoy supervisors responsi-
ble for checking whether the rules for conducting counterintelligence and ap-
plying countermeasures in a particular context do not contravene policy. 
2. LAWFUL CYBER DECOY POLICY 
Policy can be used to provide guidance within an organization on how to 
properly use software-based deception mechanisms. For instance, the tele-
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phone company in the preceding example could have a policy that all of its 
networks must require knowing intelligent waiver by the user of certain pri-
vacy rights after reasonable notice has been given to both legitimate users 
and intruders that software deception is in use would protect the company, 
absent any other egregious behavior on its part, from being held legally re-
sponsible for damage incurred by the user due to the user's interaction with 
the software decoys. 
Criminal law already goes a long way toward giving us analogies for 
preventing or punishing improper state use, and criminal and civil law give 
us a range of tools to use against private actors. However, there are gaps in 
the law. For example, what if corporations start using software decoys 
within acceptable limits and contract out those aspects of deception that 
would cross the line (i.e., be unlawful) while maintaining plausible deniabil-
ity'? (N.B.: Nations often contract out covert operations to civilians.) 
2.1 The view of deception in society 
Deception or "ruses of war" is permissible in military campaigns, and 
only runs afoul of the law when it rises to the level of "perfidy," the treach-
erous misleading of an enemy about his-or your-status under the law. 
However, there is a cultural bias in the United States against the use of de-
ception by any level of government, as evidenced by the recent reluctance to 
institutionalize deception by quashing the effort to create the U.S. Office of 
Strategic Influence, whose charter was to conduct perception management 
across agencies, including disseminating misinformation to foreign journal-
ists in support of the war on terrorism [3]; there is also a strong legal and 
cultural predisposition against using domestic U.S. journalists for active de-
ception (vice selectively withholding information, which can be enormously 
effective in crafting the desired conclusion), including formal guidance 
within the intelligence community against using them in covert operations. 
It is possible that proposals by the Department of Homeland Security and 
other government agencies, to defend against terrorist attacks on cyber prop-
erty, may also fall victim to negative public sentiment: there are enough 
mainstream concerns about civil liberties to render a potentially intrusive 
program politically unpalatable. Thus, we propose that individuals and or-
ganizations apply principled analysis in assessing the legality of using soft-
ware-based deception. 
2.2 Principled analysis of decoy usage 
Principled analysis of the use of deception involves taking into account 
the value of the target, the nature and immediacy of the threat, the identity of 
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the actors, the degree to which any state is supporting them, etc. For in-
stance, consider the principle of proportionality, as it pertains to the jllS ill 
bello, or the law which operates between belligerents in time of war: "[t]he 
principle of proportionality requires the military commander to balance the 
collateral damage (against civilians and their property) of a planned attack 
against the concrete and direct military advantage expected to be gained" 
[4]. In other words, while civilians and their property may never be targeted 
as such, the amount of permissible collateral damage varies with the imme-
diate importance of the military target. This applies to digital in cyberspace 
as certainly as it does to kinetic warfare in real space. Beyond proportional-
ity, there are three additional customary principles of the law of armed (and 
information) conflict: chivalry, which embodies the distinction between 
lawful ruses of war and unlawful perfidy, as mentioned above; discrimina-
tion, which allows military objectives, such as combatants and their equip-
ment and facilities, to be targeted, but prohibits the intentional targeting of 
civilians or their property; and necessity, which has two components. Its 
quantitative component allows the use of all the force necessary to accom-
plish a lawful military mission, but no more; its qualitative component per-
mits all means for accomplishing such a mission, with the exception of a 
small number of uncivilized weapons and techniques deemed too inhumane 
to be used to any degree. Such outlawed means include chemical weapons, 
biological weapons, x-ray transparent bullets, and blinding lasers. These 
four customary rules, described as they pertain to military use of software 
decoys to protect semantic webs, may be found in [2]. 
Let's proceed to the example of software decoys generating unwanted 
side effects due to the presence of software defects in the decoys. The prin-
ciple of proportionality applies here: if the government fails to allocate ade-
quate resources to test and validate its decoys, it would be difficult to con-
duct a proper proportionality analysis in the heat of information operations in 
a time of war. Numerous other legal problems, particularly under the princi-
ple of necessity, also arise, potentially generating legal liability up to and 
including the status of "war criminal" for information operators, mission 
planners, military commanders, and civilian approval authorities. With ap-
propriate advance work, these potential consequences-certainly those due 
to advance negligence or recklessness-may be virtually eliminated. 
3. CONCLUDING REMARKS 
It is possible that software decoys can be used as an airlock between the 
technology and the law in that the decoys can be programmed with a wide 
spectrum of options for taking action. Software decoys provide for antici-
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patory exception handling. In other words, the decoy anticipates the types of 
inappropriate interaction between the calling process and the wrapped unit of 
software, providing in advance rules for learning about and evaluating the 
nature of the interaction, in addition to rules for response. One could envi-
sion developing policy that places boundaries on the extent and type of de-
ception to be employed, but providing some degree of latitude to the user of 
decoys to inject creativity into deceptions so as to increase the likelihood 
that the deceptions will be effective. The boundaries could be used to de-
lineate the thresholds that if breached could result in the misuse or unlawful 
use of decoys. That is, principled analysis can be used to meet all domestic 
legal criteria, and set absolute minima in terms of the four customary princi-
ples of discrimination, necessity, proportionality, and chivalry. 
Lastly, the U.S. Department of Homeland Security will be responsible for 
coordinating the protection of both public and private cybernetic property 
using cyber weapons. There are gray areas in the law regarding how to co-
ordinate counterintelligence activities and countermeasures that need to take 
place at the intersection of law enforcement, intelligence collection, and 
military activity. Principled analysis can help here too, but public policy-
makers will need technically and legally sophisticated advice to manage the 
best technological defense available within the framework of the la w. 
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